What Is Really Going On In Ukraine


How Putin Uses Fake News to Wage War on Ukraine

By Nolan Peterson On 4/3/17 at 12:50 AM





This article first appeared on the The Daily Signal.

As the Russian shells and rockets rained down on them in the front-line town of Debaltseve in February 2015, Ukrainian troops began to receive curious, anonymous text messages on their cellphones.

“Your comrades nearby already left their positions, so you should leave yours as well,” one message read.

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The messages also claimed that Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, as well as Ukrainian military commanders, had “betrayed” the soldiers.

The Ukrainian military later concluded that Russian military forces had taken over the local cellphone network with mobile jamming stations. The text messages were part of a psychological operation against Ukrainian troops, not too different in its intent from dropping propaganda leaflets from airplanes, a psychological warfare technique that dates back to World War I as a way to demoralize troops.

“Three years into the Russian aggression, we have experienced every Kremlin method and technique there is,” Poroshenko told The Daily Signal.

“And I should remind that Moscow started its campaigns in Crimea and eastern Ukraine particularly with the subtle manipulation of information,” Poroshenko said. “Tanks, artillery and hundreds of innocent victims followed later.”

The combined use of propaganda and cyberwarfare to support military operations on the ground are hallmarks of Russian “hybrid warfare.”

In Ukraine, Russian military forces have combined World War I and II–era weapons and tactics—like artillery bombardments, tank attacks and trench warfare—with weapons unique to the 21st century battlefield, such as cyberattacks and sophisticated propaganda campaigns geared toward TV and internet audiences.

In September 2014, U.S. Gen. Philip Breedlove, then NATO’s top commander, called Russia’s hybrid war in Ukraine “the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare.”

“Fake news is a weapon,” Viktor Kovalenko, a Ukrainian journalist and army combat veteran from the 2015 battle of Debaltseve, told The Daily Signal.

“I saw firsthand how Russians use fake news against the Ukrainian troops on the front line,” Kovalenko, a former professor of journalism at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kiev, added. “Via fake news Russians wanted to defeat Ukrainians the same way, effectively, as by artillery and tanks.”

Related: Nolan Peterson: Ukrainians hunker down for a long war

Hybrid warfare is Russia’s modern interpretation of a Soviet military doctrine called “deep battle,” in which military operations extend beyond the front lines deep into an enemy country’s territory in order to hinder its ability to wage war.

And, some say, Russia is tapping into its hybrid warfare arsenal, now battle-tested in Ukraine, to wage a uniquely 21st century style of war against the United States and the European Union.

For its part, the U.S. is currently investigating whether Russia spread fake news and used cyberwarfare to interfere with the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

“Whether it is Ukraine, the EU, or the United States, Russia has the same playbook and goals,” Poroshenko, the Ukrainian president, said. “It employs hybrid warfare—so-called fake news, computer hacking, cyberattacks on critical infrastructure, snap drills, direct military interventions, and so on and so forth—to undermine the Western democracies and break the transatlantic unity.”


Fake News, Real War

In 2014, Kovalenko was conscripted into the Ukrainian army’s 40th Brigade as an active-duty senior lieutenant. In late January 2015, the 40th Brigade was hunkered down in the eastern Ukrainian town of Debaltseve, taking intermittent artillery fire as they skirmished against infantry assaults from a combined force of pro-Russian separatists and Russian regulars.

Then, on January 28, all hell broke loose. A massive artillery, mortar, and rocket bombardment pummeled the Ukrainian troops in and around Debaltseve.

“We had already become accustomed to the sound of distant, sporadic shelling,” Kovalenko wrote in his diary at the time. “But on the evening of 28 January, mortar shells and self-propelled rockets, launched from Russian MLRSs (‘Grads’), began falling on our base so frequently that, as it seemed to me, they were exploding several times per second.”

The only refuge was to seek shelter underground. And that’s what many soldiers and civilians did. And that’s where many of them died.

In late February 2015, weeks after the battle ended, the United Nations reported that the bodies of hundreds of civilians had been found in houses and in cellars throughout Debaltseve. Some were entombed when their homes collapsed onto them due to a direct hit. Others suffocated when incendiary devices sucked the oxygen out of the air.

Altogether, more than 500 Ukrainian civilians died in the battle, according to United Nations and U.S. estimates.

In one bombardment, a piece of rocket shrapnel about the size of a gumball tore through the room in which Kovalenko was sleeping, slicing through his sleeping bag like a razor. Kovalenko was unscathed, but rattled.

“From that night I slept on the bed no more!” Kovalenko wrote. “Two weeks later, on 13 February, the whole bedroom was completely destroyed by enemy mortars and rockets.”

Minutes, seconds; feet, inches. That’s often the threshold between life and death in this kind of war. Your survival often has less to do with your skills as a soldier than just blind luck.

Describing one close call, Kovalenko wrote:

The location of the shell hole in the backyard led me to conclude that I had miraculously survived with God’s help, because at the moment of the explosion I was standing indoors behind a thick concrete wall. But if I hadn’t delayed exiting the apartment, I would have run right into the blast-area of death.


Seeing Red

As fighting raged in Debaltseve, cease-fire negotiations were going on 750 miles away in the Belarusian capital of Minsk.

Ukrainian officials later claimed that the approximately 6,000 Ukrainian troops in Debaltseve faced a combined Russian-separatist force of about 15,000 to 17,000 soldiers, including about 12,000 to 13,000 Russian regulars.

The Kremlin denied it was supporting the separatists or had its own troops fighting in Ukraine. Yet, tellingly, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a place at the cease-fire’s negotiating table alongside Poroshenko, German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande.

A deal was struck in Minsk on February 12. The cease-fire was supposed to go into effect on February 15, but it was dead on arrival. Russian artillery, rockets and small arms assaults never let up in Debaltseve.

“From early morning till late evening, and sometimes during the nights, they have been shelling, firing and trying to break our defense lines,” Kovalenko wrote in his diary from the battle. “Their attacks couldn’t be possible without support from Russia, which sends them heavy weaponry, lots of ammunition, and military instructors as well.”

Then, on February 18, 2015, suffering heavy casualties, and while under persistent shelling and rocket fire, Ukrainian forces withdrew from Debaltseve. In the ensuing chaos, Ukrainian soldiers who missed the mechanized retreat had to escape on foot, dodging Russian Grad rockets—a multiple-launch rocket system that carpets a targeted area in a hailstorm of shrapnel and explosions.

Today, the town remains under combined Russian-separatist control.

Overall, about 185 Ukrainian soldiers died in the battle, with about another 200 listed as captured or missing.

On February 23, 2015, Ukrainian soldiers taken prisoner in Debaltseve were paraded through the separatist strongholds of Donetsk and Luhansk. It was Defender of the Fatherland Day—a Russian holiday that commemorates the first mass conscription into the Red Army during the Russian Civil War.

“Russian media aggressively labeled the Ukrainians ‘Nazis’ and ‘fascists,’ so that the purported mass parade of [prisoners of war] would awaken memories of how the Soviets happily paraded German prisoners on Red Square, Moscow, in 1945,” Kovalenko wrote.


Hybrid War

More than two years after Minsk II went into effect, daily combat persists along the 250-mile-long front lines in eastern Ukraine’s embattled Donbas region.

A third of the 10,000 Ukrainians who have died in the war were killed after the February 2015 cease-fire was signed. Casualties, both civilian and military, still occur daily on both sides of the conflict. And about 1.7 million Ukrainians remain de facto refugees in their own country due to the war.

The Minsk II cease-fire has largely kept the war in check, and both sides have not made any major offensives in more than two years. But the Ukraine war is not confined to the battlefields of the Donbas.

Related:  Nolan Peterson: While Trump fiddles, Putin steps up war in Ukraine

As airpower did after World War I, Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine has redefined the boundaries of the modern battlefield.

“Cyberpower has in part replaced many forms of traditional power, from air and submarine power to assassination,” Kenneth Geers, ambassador of NATO’s cybersecurity center and a senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, told The Daily Signal.

Early airpower theorists argued that targeting an enemy country’s industry and infrastructure could destroy its industrial capacity to wage war. That theory was later extended to include targeting civilian population centers to damage morale.

In his 1921 book, The Command of the Air, Italian air warfare theorist Giulio Douhet wrote: